Do you see any of these being used by Democrats in this election? I think so.

Thirty-eight dishonest tricks of argument (taken from “Straight and crooked thinking” by Robert H. Thouless, Pan Books, ISBN 0 330 24127 3, copyright 1930, 1953 and 1974):
Emotional Language
(1) The use of emotionally toned words (pp 10-25)
Approach: Translate the statement into words emotionally neutral

Faulty Distribution
(2) Making a statement in which “all” is implied but “some” is true (pp 27-38)
Approach: Put the word “all” into the statement and showing that it is then false.

Invalid Sampling
(3) Proof by selected instances (pp 32-37)
Approach: Dealt with (a) dishonestly by selecting instances opposing your opponent’s contention or (b) honestly by pointing out the true form of the proof (as a statistical problem in association) and either supplying the required numerical facts or pointing out that your opponent has not got them.

Reductio Ad Absurdum
(4) Extension of an opponent’s proposition by contradiction or by misrepresentation of it (pp 39-43)
Approach: State again the more moderate position which is being defended.

Evasion of Truth
(5) Evasion of a sound refutation of an argument by the use of a sophistical formula (pp 41-44)
Approach: Analysis of the formula and demonstration of its unsoundness.

(6) Diversion to another question, to a side issue, or by irrelevant objection (pp 44-48)
Approach: Refuse to be diverted from the original question, but stating again the real question at issue.

Non Sequitur
(7) Proof by inconsequent argument (pp 49-50)
Approach: Ask that the connection between the proposition and the alleged proof be explained, even though the request for explanation may be attributed to ignorance or lack of logical insight on the part of the person making it.

Lesser of Two Evils (false dilemma)
(8) The argument that we should not make efforts against X which is admittedly evil because there is a worse evil Y against which our efforts should be directed (pp 50-52)
Approach: Point out that this is a reason for making efforts to abolish Y, but no reason for not also making efforts to get rid of X.

Appeal to Moderation (Hegel’s Fallacy)
(9) The recommendation of a position because it is a mean between two extremes (pp 52-54)
Approach: Deny the usefulness of the principle as a method of discovering the truth. In practice, this can most easily be done by showing that our own view also can be represented as a mean between two extremes.

Appeal to Casuistry
(10) Pointing out the logical correctness of the form of an argument whose premises contain doubtful or untrue statements of fact (p 58)
Approach: Refuse to discuss the formal logic of the argument but point out the defects of its presentations of alleged fact.

Formal Fallacy
(11) The use of an argument of logically unsound form (pp 58-64)
Approach: Since the unsoundness of such arguments can be easily seen when the form of the argument is clearly displayed, an opponent who does this can be dealt with by making such a simple statement of his argument that its unsoundness is apparent. For one’s own satisfaction when reading an argument of doubtful soundness, it will often be found useful to make a diagram.

Circular Reasoning
(12) Argument in a circle (p 64)
(13) Begging the question (pp 65-66)
Approach: Both 12 and 13 can be dealt with in the same way as 11; by restating your opponent’s argument in such a simple way that the nature of the device used must be clear to anyone.

(14) Discussing a verbal proposition as if it were a factual one, or failing to disentangle the verbal and factual elements in a proposition that is partly both (pp 67-77)
Approach: Point out how much of the question at issue is a difference in the use of words and how much (if at all) it is a difference as to fact or values.

(15) Putting forward a tautology (such as that too much of the thing attacked is bad) as if it were a factual judgment (pp 71-72)
Approach: Point out that the statement is necessarily true from its verbal form.

(16) The use of a speculative argument (pp 78-83)
Approach: Point out that what is cannot be inferred from what ought to be or from what the speaker feels must be.

(17) Change in the meaning of a term during the course of an argument (pp 88-94)
Approach: Get the term defined or by substituting an equivalent form of words at one of the points where the term in question is used and seeing whether the use of this form of words will make true the other statements in which this term is used.

False Dilemma
(18) The use of a dilemma which ignores a continuous series of possibilities between the two extremes presented (pp 103-105)
Approach: Refuse to accept either alternative, but pointing to the fact of the continuity which the person using the argument has ignored. Since this is likely to appear over-subtle to an opponent using the argument, it may be strengthened by pointing out that the argument is the same as saying, “Is this paper black or white?” when it is, in fact, a shade of gray.

False Continuity
(19) The use of the fact of continuity between them to throw doubt on a real difference between two things (the “argument of the beard”) (pp 105-108)
Approach: Point out that the difference is nevertheless real. This again may be made stronger by pointing out that application of the same method of argument would deny the difference between “black” and “white” or between “hot” and “cold.”

Inadequate Definition
(20) Illegitimate use of or demand for definition (p 109)
Approach: If an opponent uses definitions to produce clear-cut conceptions for facts which are not clear-cut, it is necessary to point out to him how much more complicated facts are in reality than in his thought. If he tries to drive you to define for the same purpose, the remedy is to refuse formal definition but to adopt some other method for making your meaning clear.

The True Believer
(21) Suggestion by repeated affirmation (pp 111-114)
(22) Suggestion by use of a confident manner (pp 114-115)
(23) Suggestion by prestige (pp 115-118)
Approach: The best safeguard against all three of these tricks of suggestion is a theoretical knowledge of suggestion, so that their use may be detected. All three devices lose much of their effect if the audience see how the effect is being obtained, so merely pointing out the fact that the speaker is trying to create conviction by repeated assertion in a confident manner may be enough to make this device ineffective. Ridicule is often used to undermine the confident manner, or any kind of criticism which makes the speaker begin to grow angry or plaintive.

Invalid Authority
(24) Prestige by false credentials (pp 115-118)
Approach: When practical, expose the falsity of the titles, degrees, etc, that are used. The prestige then collapses.

Use of Technical Jargon
(25) Prestige by the use of pseudo-technical jargon (pp 116-118)
Approach: Ask in a modest manner that the speaker should explain himself more simply.

False Humility
(26) Affectation of failure to understand backed by prestige (pp 118-119)
Approach: Dealt with by more than ample explanation.

Interrogation Tactics
(27) The use of questions drawing out damaging admissions (pp 199-120)
Approach: Refuse to make the admissions. The difficulty of this refusal must be overcome by any device reducing one’s suggestibility to the questioner.

Appeal to Authority
(28) The appeal to mere authority (pp 122-125)
Approach: Considering whether the person supposed to have authority had a sound reason for making the assertion which is attributed to him.

Getting to “Yes”
(29) Overcoming resistance to a doubtful proposition by a preliminary statement of a few easily accepted ones (pp 128-130)
Approach: Knowledge of this trick and preparedness for it are the best safeguard against its effects.

Appeal to Prejudice
(30) Statement of a doubtful proposition in such a way that it fits in with the thought- habits or the prejudices of the hearer (pp 133-135 and p 157)
Approach: A habit of questioning what appears obvious is the best safeguard against this trick. A particular device of value against it is to restate a questionable proposition in a new context in which one’s thought-habits do not lead to its acceptance.

Faulty Assumptions
(31) The use of generally accepted formulae of predigested thought as premises in argument (pp 161-166)
Approach: The best way of dealing with predigested thinking in argument is to point out humorously and with a backing of real evidence that matters are more complicated than your opponent supposes.

Appeal to Ignorance
(32) “There is much to be said on both sides, so no decision can be made either way”, or any other formula leading to the attitude of academic detachment (pp 166-167)
Approach: Point out that taking no action has practical consequences no less real than those which result from acting on either of the propositions in dispute, and that this is no more likely than any other to be the right solution of the difficulty.

Mere Analogy
(33) Argument by mere analogy (pp 169-178)
Approach: Examine the alleged analogy in detail and pointing out where it breaks down.

Bad Analogy
(34) Argument by forced analogy (pp 178-179)
Approach: Expose by showing how many other analogies supporting different conclusions might have been used.

Incite to Anger
(35) Angering an opponent in order that he may argue badly (pp 146-147)
Approach: Refuse to get angry however annoying our opponent may be.

Special Pleading
(36) Special pleading (pp 154-156)
Approach: Apply the opponent’s special arguments to other propositions which he is unwilling to admit.

Appeal to Selfishness
(37) Commending or condemning a proposition because of its practical consequences to the bearer (pp 157-158)
Approach: Form a habit of recognizing our own tendencies to be guided by our prejudices and by our own self-interest, and of distrusting our judgment on questions in which we are practically concerned.

Ad Hominem Attacks
(38) Argument by attributing prejudices or motives to one’s opponent (p 159)
Approach: Point out that other prejudices may equally well determine the opposite view, and that, in any case, the question of why a person holds an opinion is an entirely different question from that of whether the opinion is or is not true.